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Abstract 
Fiscal policy in Portugal has been on an unsustainable path since 2004, at least. An 
econometric analysis, taking into account Portugal’s economic history, applied to an annual 
dataset from 1977 until 2011 illustrates a positive response in fiscal policy to increased debt. 
However, the response is not sufficient to stabilise the current debt-to-GDP level. 
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1 Introduction 
The main research topic for macroeconomic policies has been monetary policy, and fiscal 
policy has been, by some, neglected. Monetary policy has been seen as the only tool to 
provide inflation stability. In light of the current fiscal crises in the Euro-zone fiscal policy 
has become a more relevant and debated issue. Fiscal policy as a tool to correct for 
asymmetric shocks within a monetary union has been brought into discussions about the 
future of the Euro-zone. (Favero & Monacelli, 2005). 
This thesis will investigate Portugal’s fiscal position and test if it exists an adjustment in fiscal 
policy when public debt increases. This can be considered as a test for sustainability of public 
finances. 
First, I will provide an outline of Portugal’s economic history. Second, motivate the 
importance of a sound fiscal policy, and provide a brief theoretical model and a review of 
existing literature. At last, an econometric analysis mounted on Claeys (2008) will be used. 
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2 History of the Portuguese economy 
2.1 Salazar regime 
Antonio Salazar led Portugal, undisrupted, as a fascist dictatorship from 1932 until his death 
in 1968. Salazar started as a Minister of Finance in Portugal in 1928, and gradually seized 
more power, until he was Prime Minister in 1932. Salazar was determined to stabilize the 
Portuguese economy, i.e. balance the budgets, reduce debt and stabilise the currency “the 
Escudo”. Salazar was a professor of Economics from the University of Coimbra.  (Corkill, 
1993, pp. 1-4).  
Portugal was in the first half of the 20
th
 century the poorest country in Europe, and a colonial 
power. Salazar’s regime shifted its policies in the 1960’s. Pre 1960, the institutional 
framework became known as “Estado Novo”1 which compromised the Colonial act in 1930, 
the new Constitution (1933) and the Labour Statute (1933). The regime was broadly an 
autarky based on self-sufficiency and limited influence and reliance from external countries. 
(Corkill, 1999, p. 11). 
Portuguese economic policy changed in the 1960’s. The change started with membership in 
the European Free Trade Association, where Portugal was one of the founding member states 
in 1958, and in 1960 membership in the International Monetary Fund, henceforth IMF, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and the World Bank. This was a reorientation in 
trade policies from protectionism and autarky towards the international markets, especially 
the European. (Corkill, 1993, pp. 1-4). 
The motivation for the change in policies was mainly due to finance the colonial wars 
(Corkill, 1993, pp. 19-20). 
Salazar was succeeded by Marcelo Caetano in 1968, who lead Portugal until the revolution in 
1974. Caetano acknowledged that “the economic autarkism had long since outlived its 
usefulness” and Portugal had to take advantage of the expanding world economy and 
restructure industry in order to gain competitiveness. (Corkill, 1993, p. 29). 
 
                                                 
1
 English: New Stage 
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Table 1: Portugal and Europe: The Timetable 
1957 Six countries sign the treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community 
1960 Portugal is a founder member of the European Free Trade Association, EFTA. 
1972 Agreement between Portugal and the EC improving trade relations and other contacts. 
1974 European Regional Development Fund (FEDER) set up. 
1977 Portugal formally requests entry into EEC (March). 
1978 Creation of European Monetary System (EMS). 
Council of Ministers accepts the principle of enlargement (April). 
Official opening of negotiations with Portugal. 
1981 European Monetary Unit (Ecu) first appears. 
1985 Completion of EC enlargement negotiations (March). 
1986 Formal entry into Community of Portugal and Spain. 
1987 Single European Act (SEA) signed. 
1988 Structural Funds doubled (February). 
1991 EEC and EFTA agree to set up a European Economic Area (EEA) in 1993. 
1993 Inauguration of single market (January). 
1994 Economic and Monetary Union (Stage two); member states move to narrow band of 
ERM (January). 
1996 Full integration of Portugal into the Community structure as “a member with full 
rights and duties”. 
1999 Introduction of single currency. 
Source: Corkill (1993, p. 90) 
2.2 1974: Revolution  
On 25 April 1974 a coup d’état was led by the Armed Forces Movement, and the provisional 
government that followed was dominated by the Portuguese Communist Party. The new 
government started a “transition into socialism”. They dissolved former monopolies and 
nationalised basic industries, and the size of the public sector doubled during the first 2 years 
after the revolution. (Corkill, 1993, p. 37). 
Although the revolution itself was peaceful it can be considered as a negative economic 
shock. For Portugal the revolution led one of the largest public sectors in Western Europe, a 
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drain in human capital as a result of an anti-fascist purge campaign, and a diminished market 
for trade after decolonisation, and an influx of refugees. (Corkill, 1993, pp. 38-39). 
In addition it was mainly the larger, and productive, industries that were nationalised, but 
these had to absorb all superfluous labour together with the public sector. In addition, 
Portugal seemed ill prepared to handle the demands for higher wages from labour unions. 
(Corkill, 1993, pp. 35, 38-39). The wage increase in Portugal can be illustrated through the 
increase in unit labour costs which is an indicator of declining competitiveness.   
 
Figure 1: Unit labour costs in Portugal and Germany. 
Figure 1  demonstrates the unit labour costs in Portugal (broken line) and Germany (solid 
line)
2. The OECD defines unit labour costs as “measure the average cost of labour per unit of 
output. They are calculated as the ratio of total labour costs to real output. As such, a ULC 
represents a link between productivity and the cost of labour in producing output”. The 
OECD ensures that data are comparable across countries. (OECD, 2007). Compared to 
Germany, Portugal has had a large increase in unit labour costs, and is now at the same level 
as Germany. 
The major feature of the Portuguese post-revolution economy is that it had one of the fastest 
rates of growth in long-term debt in the world. After austerity measures failed to reduce the 
increasing current account deficit and debt the IMF had to dictate monetary policy during 
1977-79. The IMF pinpointed three causes of the crisis: wage inflation, an overvalued 
                                                 
2
 Data from the OECD statistical database. 
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currency, and a lax monetary policy.  The IMF “cure” consists of export stimulation through 
devaluation, lower wages, austerity, increased interest rates and stricter credit controls. The 
cure was a short-term success, inflation fell and the current account deficit was reduced. The 
IMF was not the sole reason for the recovery, a major factor contributing to the decreased 
current account surplus was the economic upturn facing the US and Europe. This increased 
the demand for Portugal’s exports, combined with increased tourism and remittances from 
emigrants. (Corkill, 1993, pp. 40-50). 
Due to the rapid recovery Portugal did not have to go through necessary structural changes to 
combat the bad economic state they were in. So with a change of government in 1980, the 
constitution was changed and the phrases “the transition to socialism” and “the construction 
of a socialist economy” was deleted, but Portugal continued to finance expansion with foreign 
borrowing. Exports could not keep up, and another equivalent “cure” by the IMF was initiated 
in 1983-1984. (Corkill, 1993, pp. 50-51). 
Corkill (1999, p. 69) describes the period from 1975 to 1985 a “lost decade” as far as 
economic modernisation is concerned. 
2.3 1986: EU membership 
Portugal was, along with Spain, allowed into the European Community (predecessor to the 
European Union, henceforth EU) formally in 1986. The Portuguese economy was still 
characterised by protectionist policies, and the Portuguese feared that their industry would not 
survive in an open market with a competitive structure. The manufacturing sector was more 
positive to the membership, as they had a low wage level compared to the rest of Western 
Europe and could predict an increase in export shares. The EU membership would also give 
incentives to investment through falling interest rates. (Corkill, 1993, pp. 90-93). 
Along with the EC membership a stable political period followed with the first ever single-
party majority government in 1987. Prime Minister Cavaco Silva lead Portugal as head of the 
social democratic party, from 1985-1995. The Cavaco Silva period is characterised by more 
liberal policies which included pro-free enterprise, a pro-business stance and the government 
committed themselves to privatise a substantial proportion of the state enterprise sector. The 
political stability combined with favourable exogenous factors (falling oil and raw material 
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prices, declining interest rates, an upturn in European growth and the arrival of pre-accession 
aid from Brussels) gave room for economic growth. (Corkill, 1993, p. 118; 1999, p. 69)  
The reforms introduced by Cavaco Silva helped create the conditions for growth. Inflation 
was tamed, the financial system liberalised, the presence and weight of the state in the 
economy was reduced, flexibility into the labour laws was introduced, and private capital 
reached new areas. (Corkill, 1999, p. 214). 
One of the major reforms introduced by Cavaco Silva was privatisation of the nationalised 
firms. After the revolution the constitution had prohibited sale of state enterprises, and the 
government should be majority owners of all state enterprises. The constitution was changed 
in 1989 and 1990, so that repurchasing of the privatised firms were not allowed and the 
government was allowed to sell off more than the 49% previously allowed. The revenue from 
privatisation was used to service the cost of public debt and restructure the state enterprise 
sector. The main goal for the privatisation process was to reduce the burden of poorly 
performing state-owned enterprises, to modernise and increase competitiveness of Portuguese 
firms and attract foreign direct investments. (Corkill, 1999, pp. 56-57). 
The economic policies conducted in Portugal in the 1990’s can be seen as a preparation for 
joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1997 (Corkill, 1999, pp. 228-230). 
Portugal’s currency, the Escudo, joined the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in April 1992, and the main goal was to bring inflation down and 
closer to the other countries level to achieve price stability. The Escudo was allowed to trade 
within the wider band, and fluctuate six per cent on either side of the central rate
3
. (Abreu, 
2001, pp. 17-20). 
In order to meet the Maastricht Criteria sketched in Box 1 Portugal had to stabilise its 
government debt, budget deficit, and further reduce inflation while keeping the exchange rate 
stable and interest rates low without spoiling growth opportunities. (Corkill, 1999, pp. 230-
231).  
                                                 
3
 The ECU central rate was set at about 1,4% below the market rate prevailing at the time. (Abreu, 2001, p. 24) 
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Box 1: The Maastricht criteria. Source Corkill (1999, p. 230) 
 
Portugal was below the requirement of public debt already in 1992 at a debt level of 49,9%
4
. 
They managed to barely stay below the target; the debt increased but due to falling interest 
rates, hence reduced debt servicing costs, privatisation receipts and more efficient tax 
collection they managed to stay below the 60% of GDP limit. (Corkill, 1999, p. 232). 
In 1992 Portugal had a record high budget surplus at 3,6%. The budget surplus deteriorated 
until accession, fluctuating at around 0% of GDP. Portugal managed to stay within the target 
of no more than 3% deficit mainly due to lowered interest rates on their debt, however both 
the primary balance and the cyclically-adjusted primary balance as a per cent of GDP 
deteriorated from 1995-1998. (Abreu, 2001, p. 27). In addition, reductions in public 
expenditures and more efficient tax collection contributed in lowering the deficit to GDP ratio 
(Corkill, 1999, p. 232). 
The Portuguese economy experienced high rates of inflation compared to the other EC 
members. In 1992 inflation was at 9,44% which was much higher  than the three best 
performing countries. Portugal managed to bring inflation down to 2,31% in 1997 a level 
consistent with price stability and up to par with the best performing countries. Banco de 
Portugal managed to conduct such a policy to make inflation expectations credible. 
Deceleration of wages, non-tradable goods prices and unit labour costs due to the negative 
output gap in 1993 made Portugal comply with the price stability criteria of the Maastricht 
treaty in July 1997. (Abreu, 2001, pp. 18-20). 
                                                 
4
 The figures referred to in this the text are consistent with the one’s I use in my econometric analysis from Bank 
of Portugal’s statistical database and AMECO, but not with Corkill’s figures.  
 Inflation had to be not more than 1,5% above the average of the three best performing 
economies. 
 The budget deficit had to remain under a 3% of gross domestic product, henceforth 
GDP, ceiling. 
 Public debt must be at or below 60% GDP. Alternatively a country must demonstrate 
that it is making significant progress to this end. 
 Long-term interest rates had to be no more than 2% above the average achieved by the 
three best performers. 
 The exchange rate had to remain within the narrow band of the ERM for two years 
(Portugal’s good recent record on currency stability, far superior to Spain and Italy, was 
particularly helpful in this regard) 
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Nominal interest rates were lowered during the 1990s due to stability of the nominal exchange 
rate and reduced inflation. Nominal convergence and the prospect of EMU participation is 
described as a virtuous circle: “Progress towards nominal convergence increased the 
likelihood of Portugal meeting convergence criteria for EMU participation, whereas at the 
same time, increased prospects of EMU participation facilitated exchange rate stability, the 
convergence of interest rates to the lowest levels in the EU and the improvement of the budget 
balance”. (Abreu, 2001, p. 27). 
This resulted in Portugal adopting the Euro in 1999. (Afonso, Claeys, & Sousa, 2011, p. 84) 
2.4 Portugal after the EURO 
After Portugal adopted the Euro in 1999, it was the first country to break the Masstricht 
Criteria’s Stability and Growth Pact’s 3% deficit requirement in the 3rd quarter of 2002 and 
they became subject to the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) and again in 2005 and 2009. 
(Afonso, et al., 2011, p. 84).  
"The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal" 2011) is a report by the European 
commission requested by Portugal on 7 April 2011. It describes a program where the goals 
are to “underpin economic growth and macro-financial stability and to restore financial 
market confidence” ("The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal," 2011, p. 16) and 
it covers the period 2011-2014. The three main points are: 
i) Putting fiscal policy on a sustainable footing. The debt to GDP ratio should be on a 
downward path from 2013. It focuses on expenditure reducing measurers, making the 
public sector more lenient and efficient.  
ii) Stabilisation of the financial sector. Strengthen bank’s liquidity and solvency through 
higher capital adequacy ratios and a solvency support fund. 
iii) In-depth structural reforms to restore external and internal balances and to raise 
potential growth. This entails reform of the labour market, reinforcement of 
competitiveness, a review of the judicial system, housing and rental market reform, 
liberalisations in services sector and network industries, reducing the administrative 
burden on companies, scaling down the direct involvement of government in the 
economy, strengthening human capital via further reform of the education system.  
("The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal," 2011, p. 16) 
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A decade of low productivity growth, deteriorating competitiveness and growing indebtness 
has made the “The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal” necessary. During the 
period before the financial crisis (2001-08), the average annual real GDP growth of the 
Portuguese economy was 1%, the second lowest in EU-27. ("The Economic Adjustment 
Programme for Portugal," 2011, p. 5). 
Portugal’s public finances have deteriorated since the country joined the euro area. 
Government deficit has been above the 3% limit almost every year.  Economic growth has 
plummeted, expenditure growth has increased and the debt-to-GDP has, as a result, increased 
from about 60% in 2004 to a projected 100% in 2011. ("The Economic Adjustment 
Programme for Portugal," 2011, p. 9). 
The global financial crises in 2008 did not harm the Portuguese economy directly because it 
was not exposed to the toxic assets. The property “boom and bust” that were present in many 
countries were absent in Portugal. ("The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal," 
2011, p. 8). 
At the time of writing, the Portuguese government has embarked on an ambitious path 
towards macroeconomic stability. The global crises revealed Portugal’s weak fiscal position, 
with public debt at around 90% of GDP and private sector debt at around 260% of GDP and 
as a result banks with the highest loan-to-deposit ratio in Europe. The goal is that public 
deficit shall be at 3% of GDP in 2013 according to the EDP, and then the public debt will 
stabilise. ("The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal," 2011, p. 41). 
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3 Existing literature and the 
importance of fiscal discipline 
The on-going public debt crisis in the Euro area is a result of the global financial crisis that 
started in 2007 and which hit Europe with full force in the autumn of 2008 with the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers. The period between 2001 and 2007 is characterised as a period of 
“unprecedented prosperity, the combination of sustained growth and declining inflation”.  
The global financial crises in 2007 was a result of deregulation of financial markets both in 
the U.S, with the final abolishment of the Glass-Steagall act
5
 from 1933 in 1999, and in 
Europe with the “Single European act” in 1986.  
Subprime mortgages were not allowed in the European Union, at least not in the same manner 
as they were in the U.S. However, European banks were exposed to the subprime mortgages 
in the U.S. and a lot of European banks also went into distress because of liquidity and/or 
solvency problems. The main trigger for the public debt crises in the Eurozone were the 
lesson from the “Great depression”. In order to avoid a recession, European governments 
should conduct expansionary fiscal policy and bail-out their banks and other financial 
institutions.  
Regarding Portugal, their banks where not heavily exposed to the toxic assets and did not 
undergo a banking crisis, but they did conduct expansionary fiscal policy that has led to their 
high debt levels, as was illustrated in section 2.4. This massive debt build-up led financial 
markets to doubt whether public finances in European countries, especially Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain were sustainable. This led to increased interest rates for sovereign 
bonds, and increased debt servicing costs for the involved countries, making their debt 
obligations even harder to fulfil. (Baldwin & Wyplosz, 2012, pp. 524-533).  
3.1 Debt and economic growth 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, p. 471) find that the historical average increase in real 
government debt after a financial crisis is 86%. This has been a characteristic of the aftermath 
                                                 
5
 Glass-Steagall Act of 1933: separated investment banks from traditional “savings & loans” as a response to the 
stock market crash in 1929, and the following “great depression”. 
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of banking crisis for the past century. Reinhart and Rogoff use the increase in debt rather than 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, because GDP may also be affected by the banking crisis. They found 
that the debt increase owed to a reduction in tax revenue and countercyclical fiscal policy 
aimed at mitigating the downturn. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010, pp. 575-578) study the connection between real economic 
growth
6
 and different debt-to-GDP levels for 20 advanced economies
7
 in the period 1790-
2009. They find a clear pattern between high debt-to-GDP ratios and low growth rates. When 
the debt-to-GDP rate exceeds 90%, average real growth rate is 1, 7% compared to 
approximately 3% for debt-to-GDP levels lower than 90%. They have included data for 
Portugal, and the recorded real growth rates are 4,8% for debt-to-GDP levels of below 30%, 
2,5% for debt-to-GDP levels between 30 and 60%, 1,4% for debt levels between 60 and 90%. 
Reinhart and Rogoff have not commented on the debt levels above 90% of GDP, as their data 
series ended in 2009. But the picture is clear: when the debt-to-GDP ratio becomes too large, 
it is associated with low economic growth. 
Governments can affect stability of the economy and its growth rate through their debt 
policies. A government who runs a balanced budget has a higher growth rate in the long-run 
than an economy that runs continuous budget deficits. The economic reason is that budget 
deficits lead to crowding out of investments, and in return the share of consumption-to-GDP 
is larger than the share of investments-to-GDP. This leads to a lower balanced growth rate in 
the long-run than under a balanced budget where there is no crowding out of investment. 
Greiner and Fincke (2009, pp. 71-79) 
Greiner and Fincke’s model can be extended to include a productive government sector that 
can run deficits to finance public investment. They assume that fiscal policy is so that the 
debt-to-GDP ratio remains sustainable. They further find that a “balanced budget scenario” 
results in a higher long-run growth rate. The alternative scenario is where public debt grows at 
a balanced growth rate along with the rest of the economy, as it will without a productive 
public sector. A debt financed productive public investments “raises the transitional growth 
rates but leads to a smaller long-run growth rate if this fiscal policy leads to a positive debt 
                                                 
6
 Reinhart and Rogoff do not define growth in a specific manner in neither of the articles cited in this paper, nor 
in their book “This this is different, eight centuries of financial folly” published by Princeton University Press in 
2009. 
7
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, The United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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ratio in the long-run. Only if the government switches back to the balanced budget scenario or 
to the scenario where public debt grows slower than capital and output, a temporarily deficit 
financed public investment raises transition growth without leading to smaller growth in the 
long-run”. (Greiner & Fincke, 2009, pp. 83-108).  
In conclusion loose fiscal policy, where governments do not pay great attention to stabilising 
debt at a low level compared to GDP, do not promote sustained growth in the long-run, unless 
the government is a creditor.  
3.2 A small model for sustainable debt 
3.2.1 Wealth dynamics - the connection between debt and deficits. 
Rødseth (2000, pp. 113-164) presents a model for the extremely open economy, and explains 
the relationship between wealth, debt and deficits in a pedagogical and precise manner. This 
section will follow Rødseth’s exposition closely for explaining government and foreign 
wealth dynamics in a growing economy in order to provide the main theoretical reference for 
wealth dynamics.  
Rødseth assume fully flexible wages, full purchasing power parity
8
 and a Hicksean income 
definition which is the maximum amount an economic agent can consume without reducing 
his real wealth and implies the use of real rates of return instead of nominal.  
The model is set in a dynamic environment with economic growth. Along the balanced 
growth path, debt should grow at the same rate as output. This may lead to a situation with 
continuous current account and government deficits. Rødseth assume perfect capital mobility, 
that output is determined by supply, and that there are no real investments. 
The model consists of three sectors, public, private and foreign, which are marked with the 
respective subscript g, p and *. In order to shorten the presentation, the wealth dynamics of 
the private sector will be disregarded. There are three types of assets, money, domestic bonds 
and foreign currency. Foreigners are assumed to not hold assets denominated in domestic 
currency. Each sector holds its own portfolio. 
                                                 
8
 Purchasing power parity implies the same price level at home and abroad. P=EP* 
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The private sector’s portfolio becomes 
(1) 
p
p
M B EF
W
P
 

,
 
with return equal to 
(2) * p
M B M
W r i
P P


 
, 
 
where the last term is seignorage.  
The government’s portfolio becomes 
(3) 
g
g
M B EF
W
P
  

,
 
with a return equal to 
(4) * g
M B M
W r i
P P


 
.
 
The equilibrium condition is
 
(5) * 0p gW W W   .
 
In Rødseth’s model the following notation apply: 
ρ*  as the real interest rate 
r  as the risk premium r=i-i*-ee 
M  as domestic money 
B as domestic bonds 
P as the domestic price level 
T as taxes in real value 
G as government consumption 
C as private consumption 
i as the nominal interest rate 
Fi as foreign currency held by domestic sector i=p, g or * 
I as real investment undertaken by the private sector. 
Real disposable income of the private and public sector are defined as 
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(6) *p p
M B M
Y Y W r i T
P P


      
(7) *g g
M B M
Y W r i T
P P


     
and the national income is given as the sum of the two sectors real disposable incomes.  
(8) * *p gY Y Y W   .
 
In equation (8) Y is the whole output, and **W  is interest payments on foreign debt.  
The growth in financial wealth in the three sectors are defined as 
(9) 
* * *
p p
g g
W Y C I
W Y G
W W C G I Y
  
 
    
 
Where (Yp-C) and (Yg-G) are considered private and public savings rates, so growth in 
financial wealth is considered the difference between savings and investments. From equation 
(9) it is clear why Rødseth use Hicks’ definition of income; it renders it possible to write the 
change in financial wealth as the difference between savings and real investments, instead of 
nominal. The second line in equation (9) is the government surplus. The latter line of equation 
(9) is equal to the deficit on the current account.  
The requirement for balanced growth is a path where the three sectors wealth-to-GDP ratios 
are constant. The wealth-to-GDP ratios are defined as 
(10) ii
W
w
Y
   for i=g, p or *. 
Differentiation of (10) yields 
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(11) 
2 2
 and using the formula for derivation of a fraction
 defines the growth rate of output
i
i
i i
i
i i
i
Wd d
w
dt Y dt
WY WY
w
Y Y
Y
Y
W W
w
Y



 



 
The latter line of equation (11) is the growth rate of the wealth-to-GDP ratio for the three 
different sectors over time. The condition for balanced growth is 0iw  . 
 For the foreign sector this implies 
(12) * * *0w W W   . 
the size of the permitted current account deficit, *W
 , is given as the growth rate of GDP times 
the existing foreign debt, *W . A high growth rate therefore allows for higher deficits and 
continuous deficits in cases where there is continuous positive growth in output. On the other 
hand, if growth rates are low, perhaps negative, and the debt-to-GDP ratio is high, the 
permitted deficits are reduced, and perhaps even turned into required surpluses. 
Stability of the government wealth ratio is derived from the growth of government financial 
wealth over time, and defined as 
(13)  * *g g
M
W W p T G
P
       
And from the definition of the growth rate, equation (11), Rødseth finds that the growth of the 
public sector financial wealth over time is 
(14) 
 * *g g
g g
g
M
W p T G WW W Pw
Y Y
       
   
He defines 
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YP
G
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

 
And rewrite equation (14) as 
(15)    * *g g gw w p m g w           . 
Government primary surplus, s, is defined as “the excess of seignorage and taxes over 
government expenditure on goods and services”. Measured relative to output the 
government’s primary surplus in equation (15) becomes 
(16)  s p m g      
The primary surplus can be used as an objective for fiscal policy, and keeping this constant is 
considered “constant fiscal policy”, as opposed to expansionary or contractive fiscal policy. 
Under constant fiscal policy the tax rate, τ, government consumption relative to GDP, g, and 
inflation, m, is constant.  
The stationary state of government debt is defined as gw . It is the level of debt that keeps the 
growth rate in government wealth equal to zero, 0gw  .  Using the definition for the surplus, 
the stationary state becomes 
(17) 
*
g
s
w
 
 

.
 
Stability requires that the growth rate of GDP exceeds the real interest rate. The stability 
condition becomes  
(18) 
* 0
g
g
dw
dw
    . 
As long as the growth rate in GDP exceeds the real interest rate, the debt level will always 
end up in the stationary level gw , regardless of the initial level. On the other hand, if the real 
interest rate is higher than the growth rate of GDP the growth rate of government wealth is 
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unstable, and will eventually explode. In the unstable case, an initial wealth level above the 
stationary level will make wealth increase infinitely, and a level below the stationary level 
will lead to perpetual debt.  
The primary surplus can be expressed as  
(19)  * gs w    . 
If the government has initial debt, 0gw  , a positive primary surplus is required in order to 
prevent the public debt ratio from exploding. A simple theory for sustainable fiscal policy 
along the balanced growth path, where the objective is to prevent the public debt ratio from 
exploding, is that in the case of *  , any primary deficit, s, is sustainable. If instead, 
*   sustainability of fiscal policy requires that that the surplus is larger than the debt 
servicing costs above the growth rate: 
(20)  * gs w   . 
The stability condition can be illustrated in a diagram: 
 
Figure 2: Dynamics of government wealth ratio 
a) Stable wealth ratio, 
equation (18). 
b) Unstable wealth ratio, 
equation (18). 
 
 
    
Source: Rødseth (2000, p. 156) 
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Figure 2 shows the stable (a) and explosive (b) paths of the government wealth ratio’s time 
paths. The dynamics are described by two opposing forces, interest rates and growth in GDP, 
for a constant surplus-to-GDP ratio. Accumulation of interests over time has an effect on the 
present level of surplus or debt. The effect is positive if there is a surplus, and negative if 
there is debt due to increased debt servicing costs. Growth in GDP make past deficits smaller 
relative to the present size of the economy, and help stabilise the wealth ratio as past deficits 
become less significant over time. The interest effect dominated when the real interest rate is 
larger than the growth rate of GDP, and the growth effect dominated when the growth rate 
exceeds the real interest rate.   
To conclude, if the real interest rate exceeds the growth rate, balanced growth requires an 
adjustment, or response, in surplus-to-GDP when debt-to-GDP is altered. If this response is 
omitted, and the budget deficit is excessive, the ratio of foreign debt-to-GDP explodes.  If, 
however, the real interest rate is lower than the growth rate, balanced growth is apparently 
possible to achieve regardless of the initial level of the primary surplus without the debt-ratio 
exploding. 
3.2.2 Debt and fiscal policy within a monetary union 
Membership in a monetary union complicates an unsustainable debt path. One country’s debt 
may have negative spillover effects on other countries access to capital markets. It may drive 
the interest rate upwards, if the capital markets are not functioning optimally. Furthermore, 
the increased interest rate may also affect the monetary policy conducted by the union’s 
central bank – The European Central Bank. The risk of increased interest rate diminishes if 
the capital markets work properly. If this is the case, the correct risk premium will be attached 
to each country’s bond price. Within a monetary union an implicit bail-out guarantee exists 
from the other member states in order to avoid a global debt crisis, and the country’s risk 
premium is distorted. (Grauwe, 2007, pp. 227-228). The current example of this is Mario 
Draghi’s (president of the European Central Bank) speech at the Global Investment 
Conference in London 26 July 2012 “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough”. 
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Grauwe (2007, p. 225) points to Belgium and Italy in the 1990s and their experience from 
running large budget deficits which quickly leads to large government debt, and debt 
dynamics which are unsustainable as examples that “vividly demonstrate the limits to the use 
of fiscal policies to offset negative economic shocks”. Kirsanova, Satchi, Vines, and Simon 
(2007) on the other hand, show through a micro-founded model that “national fiscal policy 
can help to stabilise individual economies within a monetary union”.  
Membership in monetary unions gives incentives to more discipline in fiscal policies. A 
sovereign country has the possibility to issue high-powered money, denoted as seignorage in 
the model by Rødseth (2000), in order to alleviate the budget constraint. Working in the 
opposite direction, there is a moral-hazard argument because a member state has less default 
risk, and has lost the power to devalue its currency, so when it acquires excessive debt the risk 
premium will not increase as much as a sovereign state. This can be shown empirically 
thorough “the average budgetary deficit of the member states in monetary unions tends to be 
lower than the average deficit of independent countries in the EC”. In conclusion, member 
states of a sovereign union face a “harder” budget constraint due the lack of issuing high-
powered money, and a monetary union disciplines fiscal policy. (Grauwe, 2007).  
3.3 How to test for fiscal sustainability? 
To empirically test for sustainability of public finances in a country, a feedback rule for fiscal 
policy is the most common technique in the literature. The following sections are a summary 
of four different articles, mainly focusing on their empirical specification of the rules, and 
their results. 
3.3.1 Bohn 1998: The behaviour of U.S public debt and deficits 
Bohn (1998) test the hypothesis of sustainability of fiscal policy in the U.S by means of an 
econometric equation that represents a fiscal rule. He examines the relationship between U.S 
government debt and primary surpluses from 1916-1995, and searches for a “systematic 
relationship between the debt-income ratio and the primary surplus”. The starting point for the 
analysis is the government’s period by period budget constraint,  
(21) 
  1 11t t t tD D S R     
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 where D denotes debt, S the primary surplus and (1+Rt+1) is the real interest factor. He 
rewrites the period by period budget constraint to ratios of GDP  
(22) 
 
 
1 1
1 1 1 1
1
 
1 1
t t t t
t
t t t t
t
d x d s
Y
x R r y
Y
 
   

 
    
 
Where lower case letters denote ratios of GDP, and yt+1 is the real growth rate and  rt+1 the real 
interest rate. The sustainability test for fiscal policy is a regression based on the period by 
period budget constraint. The connection between debt-to-GDP ratio and the primary surplus 
becomes: 
(23) 
t t t t t t
t t t
s d Z d
Z
    
  
    
 
 
where Zt denotes other determinants of the primary surplus. Equation (23) “provides a new 
sustainability test that does not require interest rate assumptions”, further “It is valid in 
economies with uncertainty and risk aversion and for arbitrary debt management policies, 
whether or not government bond rates are above or below the growth rate”. (Bohn, 1998, pp. 
960-961). 
In order to avoid the possible omitted variable bias when estimating Bohn refers to Barro’s 
tax-smoothing model from 1979
9. Barro’s model implies “that the non-debt determinants of 
the primary surplus are the level of temporary government spending, GVAR, and a business 
cycle indicator, YVAR”. (Bohn, 1998, p. 951). 
Bohn’s regression model becomes: 
(24) 0t t G t y t ts d GVAR YVAR         . 
Regression equation (24) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected coefficient standard errors (HAC) are used 
for testing. After adjusting for cyclical factors and fluctuations in government spending, Bohn 
finds a significant and positive coefficient for debt in regression model (24). The economic 
implication of a positive and significant coefficient is that the government will react to an 
                                                 
9Barro’s tax smoothing model  can be found in: Barro, Robert J., “On the Determination of Public Debt,” Journal 
of Political Economy, LXXXVII (1979), 940-971.  
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increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The government response is to increase the primary surplus 
in order to curb the growth in debt. (Bohn, 1998, pp. 952-954).  
One of Bohn’s major concerns is the existence of a unit root in debt, i.e. that the variables are 
non-stationary (Kennedy, 2008, p. 302). However, Bohn show that the debt-to-GDP ratio is 
stationary for the U.S economy within the period Bohn tests for and that U.S fiscal policy is 
in fact sustainable  and “sufficient to keep the debt-GDP ratio stationary in the future unless 
interest rates and growth rates move very unfavourably”. 
3.3.2 Favero and Monacelli 2005: Fiscal policy rules and regime 
(in)stability in the US. 
Favero and Monacelli (2005) study fiscal policy rules and regime (in)stability in the US. 
Their analysis differs from Bohn (1998) in two ways, they apply Markow-switching models  
to endogenise regime changes when they estimate fiscal policy, and do not rely on constant-
regime assumptions. Secondly, they look at the policy mix between monetary and fiscal 
policy.  
Much of the literature regarding policy regimes focus on monetary policy in isolation. 
Optimal rules for monetary policy often assume stability in the underlying fiscal policy 
regime. A regime where monetary policy is the main economic stabilisation mechanism, and 
underlying fiscal stability is assumed, is referred to as passive. Underlying fiscal stability 
implies that a sufficiently strong response to fiscal deficits to variations in real debt is taken 
for granted, or assuming that the government budget is balanced at all times. On the other 
hand, active regimes refer to a policy situation where debt exists and is stabilised
10
. 
Favero and Monacelli proposes a specification of the fiscal rule “aimed at capturing a gradual 
convergence of the fiscal instrument (primary deficit in our case) to some specified target 
level, in a spirit similar to the on adopted recently for the estimation and analysis of so-called 
Taylor rules for monetary policy”.  The target deficit is assumed to feature a response to two 
main arguments; the output gap and the debt-stabilising deficit. The output gap captures the 
cyclical component of fiscal policy. The debt-stabilising deficit “allows to control for the 
time-varying effects of interest rate and growth rate of GDP on the debt-service component of 
                                                 
10
 Favero and Monacelli follow Leeper (1991) for the terminology describing the different regimes. Policies that 
stabilise debt are “active” and policies that do not, are “passive”. (Afonso, et al., 2011, p. 89) 
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the deficit”. The elasticity of the primary deficit to the debt-stabilising deficit captures 
whether fiscal policy is active or passive.  
The final regression model is based on the government budget constraint: 
(25)  
where Bt is nominal debt, rt is the average net nominal cost of debt, and Dt  is the nominal 
primary deficit. The nominal government budget constraint, equation (25), says that current 
debt is equal to last periods debt plus interest payments plus the current primary deficit. 
Favero and Monacelli proceeds by expressing the budget constraint as ratios of GDP and in 
real terms: 
(26) 
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Where lower case letters express debt and deficit as fractions of GDP, and gt is the growth 
rate of nominal GDP. Imposing 1t tb b   for all t becomes the debt-stabilising deficit:  
(27) 
 
  1
*
1
t t
t t
t
r g
d b
g


 

. 
Equation (27) displays the debt stabilising deficit and shows how “the relationship between 
(past) debt and dt* depends on the difference between rt and gt”. Dynamic efficiency, or 
sustainable debt, is characterised by a nominal growth rate of GDP exceeding the average net 
nominal cost of debt. If this is the case, a primary surplus is debt-stabilising. 
The specification of the regression models becomes: 
(28) 
 
    
     
1
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1
*
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
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Where td is “the target level of the primary deficit, xt is the output gap, vt is an error term that 
captures discretionary exogenous deviations from the rule (interpretable as fiscal policy 
shock). st indicates that the coefficients (i.e., the features of the underlying fiscal regime) are 
allowed to evolve stochastically over time. This specification allows for identification of 
  11t t t tB r B D  
23 
 
different regimes in the conduct of fiscal policy. Through estimating a Markow-Switching 
model the probability of each regime (active or passive) can vary endogenously, and it 
renders it possible to identify in which time periods fiscal policy has been either active or 
passive. The specification also implies that government debt and primary deficit is non-
linearly related. The output gap is included to control for the cyclical component, and the 
measure of the fiscal instrument is actual deficit. 
After estimating regression model (28) Favero and Monacelli find that fiscal policy in the US 
can be classified as active through most of the period and passive fiscal policy is found 
between 1974Q4-1975Q2 and 1995Q2-2001Q2. The coefficient for the debt stabilising 
deficit, γ1, characterises the different regimes. The regime where γ1 is positive, significant and 
close to 1 is labelled “passive” according to the terminology above. Under the passive regime 
the deficit will decrease in order to stabilise the debt-to-GDP level, and curb further growth in 
debt-to-GDP. Under the active regime primary deficit will increase and it exist a destabilising 
response of the primary deficit to the debt-stabilising deficit.  
Favero and Monacelli also apply the regression model with constant regime expectations and 
their findings are consistent with Bohn (1998) “a generally passive fiscal policy in the US 
post-war history”. This, however, is inconsistent with the results of the Markow-Switching 
model which found that fiscal policy has mainly been active throughout the period. 
Considering the historical aspect and fit of the data, the discrepancy between the regression 
models may favour a regression model that does not have constant regime expectations. 
The specification of the fiscal rule as in the first line in equation (28) is subject to two types of 
simultaneity. First, there is a potential joint dependence between primary deficit and debt. 
Second, there is a potential simultaneity between output gap and deficit because the fiscal 
shock, vt, may be correlated with the output gap.   
The simultaneity problem is addressed by first acknowledging that the debt-stabilising deficit 
allows to instrument current debt with lagged debt as is done in equation (27). Second, the 
debt-deficit simultaneity bias is likely to be present in both regimes (active and passive) so 
they conclude that there will be no difference in the estimated coefficients. The simultaneity 
bias between the fiscal policy shock and output gap is threated by instrumenting the output 
gap via its own lagged values. This will “disentangle the effect of output fluctuations on the 
fiscal rule from the effect of the fiscal shock on output”. 
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3.3.3 Afonso, Sousa and Claeys 2011: Fiscal regime shifts in 
Portugal 
Afonso, et al. (2011) estimate fiscal regime shifts in Portugal in the same manner as Favero 
and Monacelli (2005) do for the US economy explained in the previous section. They find 
evidence of a deficit bias and pro-cyclical government budgets in the Portuguese economy in 
the period 1978-2002.  
Government debt and budget deficits are driven by both long-term trends and short term 
fluctuations. To model changes in fiscal policy they use a fiscal policy rule, or reaction 
function, that captures the response to government debt and the business cycle. They utilise 
the debt-stabilising budget surplus because it captures both the long-term trends and the short-
term fluctuations in government debt.  
The budget surplus at time t becomes 
(29) ttt gts  ,
 
where the budget surplus, st, is given as the difference between government revenue, tt, and 
government spending, gt. All variables are expressed as ratios to GDP. 
The government budget constraint is given by 
(30) 
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The change in debt over time, bt, is dependent on the primary surplus, and the accumulation 
of past interest payments on debt which is dependent on the difference between the real 
interest rate, rt, and the real economic growth rate, yt. Equation (30) says that if economic 
growth exceeds the interest payments, a budget deficit still coincides with debt stabilisation. 
On the other hand if the real interest rate exceeds the real economic growth rate the debt 
increases.  
To keep the debt-to-GDP ratio constant over time the surplus has to equal 
(31) 
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Equation (31) defines the debt stabilising surplus ts as a fraction of GDP. Increased real 
interest rates, or suppressed real growth rates, will increase the requirement for the debt 
stabilising output. In Portugal, high real interest rates and inferior growth rates made the 
requirement for debt stabilising budget surplus 15% of GDP in the 1980’s. As interest rates 
started to converge to the EMU level and Portugal’s credit rating improved, growth also 
started to increase, which made the debt stabilising surplus stabilise at around 2% of GDP.  
The behaviour of fiscal policy in Portugal is presented by a fiscal rule. The fiscal rule is 
derived from a fiscal reaction function, and it’s response to government debt and the business 
cycle, given by equation (32):  
(32)    **ˆ bbyyff ttt     
Where f
*
 is the long term fiscal target, b
*
 the long term debt target and y
*
 the long term output 
target.   ̂ is the deviation from the target due to discretionary policy responses in addition to 
those of the normal fiscal stabilisers. However, fiscal policy will only gradually adjust to its 
target level according to 
(33)  1 ˆ1t t t tf f f v     . 
Substituting (33) into (32), and adding and subtracting y  yields the fiscal rule 
(34)   1 1t t t t tf f x b v          . 
Where 
 * * * is a constant
 is the output gapt t
f y y b
x y y
     
 
. 
The constant term, κ, can be interpreted as “a long-term fiscal indicator: it adjusts the target 
surplus for the deviation between the government’s output target and long-term potential 
output, and for the government debt target”. Further the authors state “deviations from the 
rule, which are captured by the residual term, vt, are discretionary changes in systematic fiscal 
policy”.  
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The final specification of the fiscal rule is characterised by the definition of the fiscal 
instrument ft as the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio st, and that they, as Favero and Monacelli 
(2005), substitute debt, bt, with the government debt-stabilising surplus, ts . The final 
specification is then given by equation (35): 
(35)   1 1t t t t ts s x s v          . 
The fiscal rule that equation (35) presents is a “non-linear fiscal rule that implicitly controls 
for the time-varying effects of interest rates and growth in the debt service component of the 
deficit that are not under the direct control of the government”. 
Fiscal policy is passive, in the same sense as in section 3.3.2, when the coefficient associated 
to the debt stabilising surplus, θ, is not statistically different from one. The economic 
implication of θ=1 is a budget that is always in balance, i.e. a sufficiently high response in 
surplus from increased debt to stabilise debt. When this criteria is not satisfied, θ<1, the 
reaction in primary surplus is less than proportional to the rise in debt, and fiscal policy is 
active. The constant term, κ, should not be statistically different from zero. A constant term 
statistically different from zero implies a non-zero surplus and cause trend growth in debt.  
The fiscal rule, regression model (35), is estimated as a Markow-Switching model in order to 
test whether there are regime changes. The cyclical response in each fiscal policy regime is 
classified as pro-cyclical, countercyclical or a-cyclical. These three states are decided by the 
coefficient for the output gap, γ, deviation from the cyclical elasticity of the budget. For 
Portugal this elasticity is 0, 46 which is slightly below the OECD average of 0,5. If γ=0,46 
automatic stabilisers are let to work, a γ>0,46 and fiscal policy is countercyclical, a γ<0,46 
and fiscal policy is pro-cyclical, and a statistically insignificant γ implies a-cyclical fiscal 
policy.  
For Portugal they find a “once and for all” regime shift in 1988. An active and a-cyclical 
fiscal policy changes to a slightly more passive and pro-cyclical fiscal policy after 1988, but 
the fiscal policy remains unsustainable and both regimes can be classified as active because 
the change is not significant for the debt response. The period before 1988 is characterised by 
high deficits, and a lack of both debt responses and cyclical responses in primary surplus. The 
period after 1988 can be split into two, both regimes are active but switching between pro-
cyclical (regime 2) and a-cyclical (regime 3) policies. Under regime 2 the surplus is set to 
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correct deviations in debt, but the average deficit is still too large for this policy to be 
sustainable. In contrast, in regime 3, the average deficit is much smaller, but the reaction of 
the primary surplus is less than proportional. 
3.3.4 Claeys 2008: Rules, and their effects of fiscal policy in 
Sweden. 
Claeys (2008) classify fiscal rules into two different groups, where both have the objective of 
obtaining a sustainable path for public finances. The first group “imposes numerical deficit or 
debt targets. Balanced budget rules, a golden rule, debt brakes etc. all belong to this class”. 
The second group of rules impose institutional changes to improve budgeting procedures.  
Sustainability is defined as “the public sector does not leave public assets or liabilities with 
any positive probability, i.e., the sum of the present discounted value of expected future 
primary surpluses suffices to pay off current debt.”  
The point of origin for Claeys’ model is an analysis of the intertemporal budget constraint, 
and the transversality condition. “The sustainability condition is met when the public sector 
does not leave any public assets or liabilities with a positive probability”, this is when the 
transversality condition holds. The equivalent time series test for fiscal sustainability is 
cointegration between the primary surplus and public debt, which implies that the total 
government deficit series is stationary. A stationary deficit series implies that undiscounted 
public debt is finite in the long run. The concept of cointegration will be discussed thoroughly 
in section 4.2. 
The relation between surplus and debt is specified as a fiscal reaction function (in the same 
manner as Bohn (1998)): 
(36) t t ts b   . 
In equation (36) st denotes the primary surplus and bt is the debt and μt is an error term. 
Equation (36) is equivalent to the method of Bohn (1998) treated in section 3.3.1, where he 
proves that a country’s (the U.S) fiscal policy is sustainable if the primary surplus reaction to 
public debt is strictly positive. Claeys refers to the “fiscal theory of the price level” or 
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passive
11
, non-ricardian, regimes as an alternative way to satisfy the intertemporal budget 
constraint.  
He regards the “fiscal theory of the price level” as too “sanguine” and selects a less debated 
approach and redefines the fiscal rule in terms of the debt stabilising surplus. The debt-
stabilising surplus becomes 
(37) 1
1
t t
t t
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. 
Equation (37) implies that “if nominal GDP growth (kt) exceeds the interest cost of debt (qt), 
persistent deficits are still consistent with debt stabilisation as real economic growth and 
inflation outgrow the interest payments”.  
Fiscal policy is decomposed into a structural and a cyclical component. The cyclical 
component includes the reduction of unemployment benefits, transfer payments and increased 
tax in an economic boom. The structural component is mainly due to discretionary fiscal 
policy, i.e. when governments “fuel a boom by lowering taxes or increasing spending, or lean 
against the wind by raising tax revenue and cutting spending”. 
(38) ˆt t tf f y  . 
In equation (38), ˆtf  is the structural component and αy is the cyclical component where α is 
the elasticity of the fiscal indicator with respect to output. 
Claeys’ empirical specification to characterise fiscal policy behaviour is based on a primary 
surplus-to-GDP target of the government *ts , based on a long-term level, *s , but also varies in 
response to cyclical conditions and public debt.  
(39)    * * * *et t ts s y y b b      . 
“The surplus target (equation (39)) fluctuates in response to expected deviations of output ety  
from the desired target output level *y . The output response γ does not only capture the 
automatic stabilisation responses of some spending and revenue categories; it also includes 
the systematic discretionary intervention of the government to cyclical conditions. If the 
                                                 
11
 The fiscal theory of the price level is a third regime which has attracted much attention recently. “The 
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied only at the equilibrium price level, and the government’s debt plays a 
critical role in determining the price level. (Walsh, 2003, p. 145). 
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government just lets the automatic stabilisers work over the cycle, then γ=α. The government 
also attaches some direct weight on debt by keeping under control deviations of debt bt from a 
steady state long-term level for debt b*”.  
The fiscal instrument is assumed to gradually adjusts to its target level: 
(40)   tttt vsss  
*
1 1  . 
This gradual convergence combined with the surplus target (equation (39)) yields the 
following non-linear relation between the surplus and public debt. 
(41)          ttttt vbyybbyysss    ***1 1  
Equation  (41) is simplified by the following definitions: 
(42) 
   
yyx
bbyys
tt 
 *** 
 
ω represents a “long-term fiscal indicator adjusted for the deviation between the government’s 
output (debt) and long-term output (debt)”. xt is the output-gap. The baseline empirical 
specification and regression model becomes: 
(43)    ttttt vbxss    11  
The residual term, vt, can be interpreted as fiscal policy shocks, i.e. “discretionary exogenous 
deviations from the rule”. 
Claeys find that fiscal policy in Sweden is not sustainable after estimating a baseline fiscal 
rule, in which the government stabilises debt with the primary surplus. The Swedish 
government does not raise its primary surplus sufficiently to pay off outstanding debt. The 
response is neither significant nor positive, suggesting that deficits have been growing along 
with debt. He also finds that the budget is “remarkably responsive to the cycle: a 1 per cent 
improvement in the output-gap strengthens the budget position by about 1,40%. This strongly 
pro-cyclical effect is known – as in other Scandinavian countries – to largely be the effect of 
the extensive welfare state and large automatic stabilisers built into the unemployment 
system. Claeys has found an active fiscal policy in Sweden, which ignores debt. 
Claeys extends his model with a Markow-Switching model to identify regime changes, and 
classify regime changes over time.  
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4 Fiscal sustainability in Portugal 
4.1 Non-stationarity 
Most macroeconomic data are non-stationary, and are often characterised by deterministic 
trends, a broken trend or by a so called stochastic trend. A “random walk” is the simplest 
example of a stochastic trend, where this period’s variable is equal to last period’s variable 
(usually called a lagged variable) plus a random error. Many econometricians, according to 
Kennedy (2008, pp. 301-302), build their model on the assumption that “the non-stationarity 
is such that differencing will create stationarity”. Differencing will remove a deterministic 
trend as well as well as a stochastic trend, but often it is the latter alone that motivates the 
differencing.   
A variable is said to be integrated by order d, denoted I(d), if it needs to be differenced d 
times to become stationary. A stationary variable is then I(0) because it has to be 
differentiated 0 times to become stationary, and a “random walk” variable is I(1) so it has to 
be differentiated once to become stationary. (Kennedy, 2008, p. 302). Variables that are I(1) 
have unconditional variances that are proportional to t
12
 and the variables will diverge as 
t , and they are never expected to obey any sort of long-run equilibrium relationship. 
(Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993, p. 716).  
Non-stationarity is problematic from an econometric point of view because asymptotic theory 
is not applicable and it might create a spurious regression, i.e. failing to remove the stochastic 
trend from the non-stationary dependent variable (Favero, 2001, pp. 45-47). Kennedy (2008, 
p. 301) describes spurious results as “results that erroneously indicate (through misleading use 
of  R
2
, Durbin-Watson and t-statistics) that a meaningful relationship among the regression 
variables exits”. Therefore it is important to test for non-stationarity before proceeding with 
the estimation. 
Non-stationarity is often related to the existence of a “unit root”, i.e. random walk. The 
economic implication of a unit root is that a shock will persist forever. (Favero, 2001, p. 47).  
                                                 
12
 The sample size 
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To see the stochastic properties of a random walk variable we first establish the solution of 
the associated difference equation, e.g., by repeated substitution. 
 thathave ly weSpecifical  
(44) 
232
121
1






ttt
ttt
ttt
ss
ss
ss



 
After substitution the relationships in (44) can be expressed as 
(45) ttttt ss    123  
Continuing the substitution back to s0 we get the solution 
(46) 


T
i
itt ss
1
0   
 for the random walk variable s. The variable at time t is equal to the initial value, s0, plus the 
sum of the disturbance terms. Since the disturbances are stochastic this part is called a 
stochastic trend.  
A generalization of (46) is to include a constant, and the generalised process is called a 
“random-walk with drift”. The exposition of a random walk with drift is similar to the one we 
have just given, and the known relationships with a constant are: 
(47) 
232
121
1





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

 
Through substitution (47) can be expressed as 
(48) 

 
T
i
ittt ss
1
3 
.
 
The solution to (48) becomes 
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(49) 


T
i
itt sts
1
0  , 
where tγ is the sum of all the constant terms and shows that the solution contains a  
deterministic trend. The value s takes at time t is equal to the sum of the initial value plus both 
the determinist trend and the error terms.  
From (46) and (49) we see for example that the white noise disturbances will imply that both 
the expectation and the variance of the s variables will depend on time, while stationarity 
require that these two moments do not depend on time.  
The term “unit-root” also has a mathematical interpretation and it comes from difference 
equations with constant coefficients. Equation (44) is a special case of  
(50) 
ttt ss   1    
where β is called the autoregressive parameter, which is set to 1 in (44). Equation (50) is a 
first order difference equation. The associated characteristic equation is  
(51) 0  , 
where λ is the characteristic root, also called an eigenvalue. In this simple case the expression 
for the eigenvalue is  
(52)    
In the random walk (with or without drift) β =1, meaning that the root is one, or unity. 
The Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests are the conventional tests 
for the null hypothesis of unit-root and non-stationarity in a time series. An example is given 
in  Favero (2001, p. 47) for a time series variable xt . The test is based on the regression 
model: 
(53) 


 
k
i
tititt xxtx
0
11 
 
The error-term in (53) has so called classical properties (expectation zero, time independent 
variance and no autocorrelation). 
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Under the unit-root null hypothesis 1 , the test statistic is defined by 
13
 
(54) 
 
 


ˆ
1ˆ
SE


 
where ˆ is the estimated coefficient from running Ordinary Least Square, henceforth OLS, on 
regression model (53). The denominator is the standard error of the estimated coefficient. 
A rejection of the null-hypothesis implies that the variable is stationary, but we have to note 
carefully that the test-statistic is not t-distributed under the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. 
The ADF test statistic is obtained by selecting an appropriate value for k in the regression 
model, in the DF test k=0.  
The appropriate asymptotic critical values for the Dickey-Fuller test are provided by e.g. 
Mackinnon (1991) and are dependent on the specification of the regression model. There exist 
three different types of test statistics; “no constant”, “constant, no-trend” and “constant, with 
trend”, denoted respectively tc  ,, . The requirement to reject the null hypothesis becomes 
stricter if there is a constant and even stricter if the model also includes a trend. The exact 
sample size is also important for calculating the critical values. The formula for the critical 
values and the table for response surface estimates of critical values are available in Davidson 
and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 272, 275 table 1). 
4.2 Cointegration 
If a variable is treated as non-stationary after use of the Dickey-Fuller test, one solution is to 
differentiate the variable until it becomes stationary, and estimate a regression of only 
stationary and differenced variables. However, this approach will take away valuable 
information about the potential long-term equilibrium relationships between the variables. A 
second solution is cointegration. Cointegration is based on the observation that some variables 
                                                 
13
 I follow Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, p. 703) who refer to the test static in Dickey-
Fuller test as τ-statistics rather than t-statistics to avoid confusion because it will not follow 
the Student’s t-distribution.  
 
34 
 
may be non-stationary, I(1), but a linear combination of them will be stationary, I(0), see e.g., 
Kennedy (2008, pp. 302-303). 
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 715-722) provides a good exposition of cointegration 
and cointegration tests. The following sections will follow their exposition closely and present 
their test for cointegration. 
Davidson and MacKinnon motivate the use, or existence of, cointegration through economic 
theory; “economic theory often suggest that certain pairs of economic variables should be 
linked by a long-run equilibrium relationship. Although the variables may drift away from 
equilibrium for a while, economic forces may be expected to act so as to restore equilibrium”. 
Examples of such pairs of variables are disposable income and consumption, government 
spending and tax revenues, and wages and prices.  
The requirement for cointegration is that the disequilibrium term defined by the suggested 
long-run relationship is stationary, I(0).This implies that testing for cointegration is a unit root 
test on the error term. The null hypothesis will be non-cointegration, with error term I(1), the 
alternative is cointegration, with error term I(0). This type of test is usually referred to as 
residual-based cointegration test. The simplest procedure is the Engle-Granger test. The test 
involves first estimating the cointegrating regression by OLS and then using the Dickey Fuller 
τ-test, based on the regression 
(55)   ttt evv  1ˆˆ   
Where tˆv  
is the residual in the cointegration regression and α is is the regression coefficient, 
equivalent to   above.  
Another approach described by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993, pp. 723-724) is to formulate 
an error-correction model, henceforth ECM, and test whether the error-correction term is I(0). 
This is the approach I will use to test for cointegration in in section 4.6.  
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4.3 Description of the DATA14. 
The empirical work is applied to an annual dataset that I have compiled from the European 
Comission’s annual macroeconomic database, AMECO and the Bank of Portugal’s statistical 
database. The time series starts in 1977 and ends in 2011. 
For analysing debt sustainability I have collected observations for the three variables: 
st: Primary balance - as a percentage of GDP. The figures are from the Bank of Portugal’s 
statistical database. 
bt: General government consolidated gross debt. The figures are based on the definiton “ESA 
1995” and former definitions prior to 1995. The figures are from the AMECO database. 
xt: The output gap. The output-gap has been made with a HP-filter in OxMetrics. I have used 
the same smoothing coefficient (λ) as Banco de Portugal15, λ=30 for annual data, and λ=7680 
for quarterly data. The figures for output are GDP at 2005 market prices from the AMECO 
database. 
In addition to the variables described above I will include some dummy variables in order to 
control for regime-shifts, or more temporary but large changes in expectations, due to 
exogenous economic or political events that have had an impact on the Portuguese economy. 
                                                 
14
 All empirical results are from PcGive v. 13 for OxMetrics developed by Jurgen A. Doornik. Information 
avalibale at http://www.pcgive.com/pcgive/index.html 
15
 I e-mailed my former professor at NOVA school of Business and Economics, João Amador, who is an 
economist in Banco de Portugal’s (Portugal’s Central Bank) research department, division for public finances 
and structural issues and he sent me the official λ values that Banco de Portugal use.  
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Figure 3: The annual debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Figure 3 shows the annual debt-to-GDP ratio in the Portuguese economy from 1977 until 
2011. Connecting this to the section about Portugal’s economic history the gradual build up in 
the debt-to-GDP ratio from the end of the 1
st
 IMF round until after the 2
nd
 IMF round in 1984 
is clearly illustrated. After EU membership in 1985 the ratio stabilises and manages to stay 
below 60% of GDP, which is the Maastricht criterion. Debt-to-GDP rises to more than 60% in 
2005 and has continued to rise since, reaching 107.9% of GDP in 2011. Analysing the trend, 
or accumulation of debt, through time, raises the suspicion of debt-to-GDP being a random-
walk variable. 
 
Figure 4: Government revenue-to-GDP and government expenditure-to-GDP.  
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Figure 4 shows the continuous gap between revenue (broken line) and expenditure (solid 
line), and illustrates the reason behind the debt accumulation. The increase in government 
revenue due to the privatisation reform in 1989-1990 is clearly shown, as are the 
counteractive measures undergone in 2009 and 2010 to reduce the impact of the global 
financial crisis. 
 
Figure 5: Government annual primary surplus-to-GDP ratio. 
Figure 5 shows the fluctuation in the budget surplus-to-GDP ratio. A period of budget deficits 
until 1986 are followed by a period of surpluses from 1986 and the 3
rd
 oil shock and 
privatisation reforms until 1993. The budget surplus-to-GDP ratio managed to stay above the 
3% deficit requirement from the Maastricht criteria until 2004. The impact of the global 
financial crisis in 2009 is also clearly illustrated here.  
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Figure 6: Output gap. 
Figure 6 shows the output-gap from 1977 until 2011. The impact of the 3
rd
 oil shock in 1986 
initiated an upswing in the Portuguese economy. Another upswing was after Portugal 
qualified for the Euro-zone. The impact of the global financial crisis in 2009 is also 
illustrated. 
4.4 Testing for a unit root in Portuguese fiscal data. 
Before starting on the regression model I check whether the data is stationary or not. I 
perform a unit root test on the surplus-to-GDP ratio and the debt-to-GDP ratio both for the 
annual and quarterly data. 
To test for the unit root in the surplus-to-GDP ratio I formulate two regression models 
(56) 0 1t t ts s      
(57) 0 1t t ts t s        
Where st is the surplus-to-GDP ratio, ρ is the regression coefficient and εt is the error term. 
Regression model (57), as opposed to (56), contains a trend, t . My null hypothesis is that 
there exists a unit root, and I test the alternative hypothesis that there is no unit root so that 
surplus-to-GDP is a stationary variable for the two regression models. 
-5
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H0: ρ=1 vs H1: ρ<1. 
Kennedy (2008, p. 303) says that the usual alternative hypothesis is ρ<1 because a ρ>1 would 
imply explosive solutions. (Although that view excludes forward-looking behaviour and 
rational expectations, which relies on ρ>1). 
When testing for a unit root the common practice is first estimate (56) by Ordinary Least 
Squares, henceforth OLS, to see the goodness of fit of the regression model and the 
misspecification tests, and then do the Dickey-Fuller test described above. After the goodness 
of fit and misspecification tests are accepted, it is common to review the Dickey-Fuller test 
with a higher degree of augmentations. The Dickey-Fuller test with a higher degree of 
augmentations is implemented in the econometric software pacakage PcGive for OxMetrics.  
The results from estimating (56) in PcGive with OLS, are reported in Table 2. 
Table 2: OLS estimation of surplus-to-GDP ratio.  Estimaton period is 1977-2011. 
 Coefficient  S.E t-statistic P-value 
st-1 0.592332 0.1426 4.15 0.0002 
Constant -0.440062 0.3987 -1.10 0.2779 
ˆ 2,11531                         T=34             R
2
= 0,3501          F[1,32] = 17,24 [0,000]** 
χ2norm[2 ] = 6.1260 [0.0467]* 
Far(1-2)[2,30] = 1.7734 [0.1871]   
Farch(1)[1,32] = 0.034154 [0.8545]   
Fhet[2,31] = 0.18639 [0.8309] 
Fhetx[2,31] = 0.18639 [0.8309]   
 
Table 2 shows that the regression model has 34 observations and 2 parameters. The reported 
standard error of the model, ˆ , is 2,115. R
2
 is the regression model’s explanatory power, 
given by  
(58) 
TSS
RSS
TSS
ESS
R  12  
where ESS is the explained sum of squares, TSS is total sum of squares, and RSS is residual 
sum of squares.. The interpretation of the reported R
2
 is that the estimated model, lagged 
surplus-to-GDP and a constant, explains 35,01% of the variation in surplus-to-GDP at time t. 
R
2
 will always increase in value when another variable is included. Adjusted R
2
 corrects for 
the number of parameters included in the model, but it does not have the “goodness of fit” 
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interpretation as the unadjusted R
2
 do. Therefore, the adjusted R
2
 will only be included as a 
reference where it is necessary to have in mind that the reported R
2
 may be “untruthful high”. 
 The reported F-test is a test for the joint null-hypothesis that all regression coefficients are 
equal to zero, versus the alternative that at least one of them is different from zero, excluding 
the intercept. The F-test tests the overall significance of the regression model. The reported 
value of the test-statistic is 17,24, and the p-value is reported in brackets. The p-value shows 
the probability of the variable being different from its critical value. A reported p-value of 
0,001 implies that the null hypothesis can be rejected at a 99% level of significance. A 
reported p-value of 0,005 implies that the null-hypothesis can be rejected at the 95% level of 
significance, and so forth.  Since the reported p-value is zero, it is possible to reject the null-
hypothesis at a 99% confidence level.
16
 
The explanatory variable st-1, which is the lagged value of the surplus-to-GDP ratio, has a 
coefficient of 0,592, with a standard error of 0,142. The interpretation of the coefficient value 
is that a one unit increase in lagged surplus-to-GDP creates an increase of 0,59 in the current 
surplus-to-GDP. The variable is significantly different from zero, with a P-value equal to 
0,0002 lagged-surplus is a significant explanatory variable at the 99% level of significance.  
The last section of Table 2 is a series of misspecification tests. The misspecification test 
evaluates the classical assumptions made for the error term.  Far(1-2) test is a test for 
autocorrelation among error terms. Farch(1) is a test for auto regressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity. χ2norm is a normality test, or Jarque-Bera test, for error-term distribution, 
that they are normally distributed around the mean, and not skewed, or have a kurtosis. The 
Fhet(X) tests are White’s test for heteroskedasticity. A good presentation of misspecification 
tests is provided by Bårdsen and Nymoen (2011) . 
When we are using times series data, the most common violation of the classical assumptions 
is residual auto-correlation Auto-correlated error-terms entails that the estimated variance of 
the OLS estimators are no longer correct. The result is that the t-statistic becomes biased, and 
                                                 
16
 The critical values for the F-distribution and student’s t-distribution are found in e.g. Hill, 
Lim, and Griffiths (2008), this also includes all future references to the critical values of the 
F-distribution and student’s t-distribution. 
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the basis for the statistical test has disappeared. With positive autocorrelation, the null-
hypothesis will be rejected more often at a 5% level of significance than is true. The most 
common test for auto-correlation in error-terms is the Durbin-Watson test-statistic. The test 
reported in Table 2 for auto-correlation is based on the auxiliary regression and follows an F-
distribution.  
The paragraph above is correct for static models, but the model considered here is dynamic 
since a lagged variable is included. One of the problems that arise when estimating a dynamic 
model is that OLS will not create an unbiased estimator. This is true for stationary time series. 
(Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). 
If the normality assumption about the error term does not hold, the distribution of the test-
statistic is unknown. The normality test-statistic has a χ2-distribution. The critical values for 
this distribution are available in Hill, et al. (2008). 
If the assumption of heteroskedastic error-terms does not hold, the OLS estimator will still be 
unbiased and consistent, but the true variance of the estimated coefficient, ˆ , may be biased. 
The square root of the variance is used when testing hypotheses and the calculated test-
statistic may then become wrong, and a variable may be regarded as insignificant because the 
estimated standard error is too high. The test-statistic follows an F-distribution. 
Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity is a form of heteroskedasticity that is 
particularly relevant for time-series data. The variance of the disturbance in a time-series 
model may be dynamic, i.e. follow a time trend. 
The unit-root test-statistic is 
(59) 
 
 
85,2
0,1426
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and has a critical value according to the Dickey-Fuller distribution with 34 observations, and 
a constant, 
(60) 94,2
34
36,8
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8321,2
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at the 95% confidence level (Mackinnon, 1991). The τc-statistic is not below the critical value 
at the 95% level and it is therefore not possible to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. The 
conclusion is that the surplus-to-GDP ratio is a non-stationary variable; it has a unit root and 
is a “random walk”. 
The unit-root test provided above is for 0 degrees of augmentation, equivalent to k=0 in 
equation(46). The Dickey Fuller test for a unit root with a higher degree of augmentation is 
provided in tTable 3, for 32 observations, with both a constant term, and a constant and a 
trend; 
Table 3: ADF test for surplus-to-GDP 
D-lag τC-ADF
a τt-ADF
b 
2 -1.728        -1.674  
1 -2.992* -3.029  
0 -2.934        -3.065  
a Test-statistic for constant with critical values:  
5%= - 2.96 1%= -3.65. T=32. 
b Test-statistic for constant and trend with critical 
values: 5%= -3.56 1%= -4.27. T=32. 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test uses the lagged differences in the surplus-to-GDP 
ratio. In order to show that the conclusion is not biased by omission of a trend I have also 
included the critical values for the Dickey-Fuller test including trend. The critical values are 
provided by the PcGive as -2,96 at a 95% confidence level for the model with a constant, and 
-3,56 at 95% level for the model with both a constant and a trend. It is not possible to reject 
the null hypothesis at the 99% level for any of the augmentations. This confirms the 
conclusion above, that the surplus-to-GDP ratio in non-stationary.  
The economic implication of a non-stationary surplus-to-GDP ratio is that it is a random 
walk, and that its current value is equal to the initial value plus the sum of all error-terms. 
According to Favero and Monacelli (2005) the error-terms are possible to interpret as fiscal 
policy shocks.  
In order to test for a unit-root in the debt-to-GDP ratio I will apply the same procedure as for 
the surplus-to-GDP ratio, but substitute for surplus-to-GDP with debt-to-GDP in equations 
(56) and (57).  
The results from the regression model for debt including a trend are reported in Table 4 
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Table 4: OLS estimation of debt-to-GDP ratio with trend.
a)
   
 Coefficient  S.E t-statistic  P-value 
bt-1 1.10723 0.09452 11.7   0.0000 
Constant -3.77158       3.045 -1.24   0.2248 
Trend 0.0119325 0.1296 0.0921   0.9272 
4,28116                         T=34             R
2
=0.9307          F[2,31] = 208,3 [0,000]** 
χ2norm[2 ] = 0.15812 [0.9240]   
Far(1-2)[2,29] = 4.1973 [0.0251]* 
Farch(1)[1,32] = 0.073794 [0.7876] 
Fhet[4,29] = 2.3876 [0.0740]   
Fhetx[5,28] = 2.0669 [0.0997]   
 
a) 
 Estimation period is 1977-2011.  
The output from regression model for debt shows that lagged debt-to-GDP has a coefficient of 
1,1, with a standard error of 0,09. The economic implication of this is that there exists a more 
than one-to-one relationship between lagged debt and current debt, so debt is growing at a rate 
higher than 1, i.e. exponential. A one unit increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio in the previous 
period results in a 1,1 unit increase in debt in the current period. The t-statistic of 11,7, has a 
p-value of 0,0000 and the variable is considered significant. The trend is not significant, with 
a reported t-statistic 0,09, and a p-value equal to 0,92 and not significant at even a 90% level. 
From the reported R
2
 value the regression model explains 93,07% of the variation in debt-to-
GDP, adjusted for the degrees of freedom. The following F-test-statistic of a joint null-
hypothesis of all regressors being equal to zero is 208,3, which has a p-value equal to 0,000, 
so it can be rejected at the 99% level. The reported misspecification test has a rejection of the 
null-hypothesis at the 99% significance level for both auto-regressive error-terms and the 
regression specification test. The auto-correlated error terms may create a biased variance, 
and the standard errors reported may be incorrect. 
Testing the null of a unit root in debt-to-GDP becomes equation (61). 
(61) 1344,1
09452,0
110723,1


t  
The critical value for the DF-test with trend and constant is according to Mackinnon (1991) 
(62)   54,3
34
83,17
34
039,4
4126,3
234,1,




tDF  
 We cannot reject the null hypothesis of ρ=1, and conclude that debt-to-GDP has a unit root. 
ˆ
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The results from including a higher degree of augmentation both for the model with constant 
and trend, and just a constant are reported in Table 5. 
Table 5: ADF test for debt-to-GDP 
D-lag τt-ADF
a τC-ADF
b
 
2 -0.3386 1.129 
1 0.4000 1.535 
0 1.472 2.582 
a Test-statistic for constant and trend with 
critical values: 5%= -3.56 1%= -4.27. T=32.  
b Test-statistic for constant with critical values: 
5%= -2.96 1%=-3.65. T=32. 
The reported critical value for the 99% confidence level is -4,27 for when the trend is 
included in addition to the constant, and -3,64 when only the constant is included. The 
reported test-statistics are above the critical values for all augmentations. This confirms the 
conclusion from the model without augmentation, that debt-to-GDP is non-stationary.  
The economic implication of this is that debt is characterised as a “random-walk” and the 
current debt level is to a large extent based on the previous period’s debt level. Since ρ is 
larger than unity the debt-to-GDP continue to grow past the previous period’s debt-to-GDP 
level. 
Bohn (1998, p. 296) argues that the unit root in debt or surplus to GDP exist due to a unit root 
in GDP. 
4.5 Econometric testing for sustainability 
To test for fiscal sustainability and the existence of a fiscal rule in the Portuguese economy I 
will formulate a basic fiscal feed-back rule based on Claeys (2008). Claeys did not find 
significant coefficients when he estimated his fiscal rule, and extended in to a Markow-
Switching process to look for regime changes. I will, however, not look for regime changes, 
but try to specify a model that test sustainability, and gives significant results. In order to get a 
get a correct specified model I will extend Claeys basic rule with dummy variables to control 
for regime shifts, or more temporary but large expectation changes, due to exogenous 
economic or political events that have an impact on the Portuguese economy, and I regard the 
long-term fiscal indicator as a constant. 
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The motivation for including the dummy variables is that economic theory often assumes 
strong ceteris paribus conditions, but real world data are not created in a controlled 
environment but are the result of a highly complex process that involves both market 
behaviour and political decisions. Assigning dummy variables to the statistical model will 
bridge the gap between theory and the estimated results. (Spanos, 1995).  
The regression model is given as 
(63) ttttt privOILFCERMIMFxbss    5432110 32  
The five dummy variables are: 
IMF2: which is 1 for 1983 and 1984, and 0 otherwise, to represent the impact the 2
nd
 round of 
IMF intervention in the Portuguese economy. 
OIL3: which is 1 for 1986 and 1987, and 0 otherwise, to represent the impact of the 3rd oil 
shock when oil prices fell by 60%. 
PRIV: which is 1 for 1989 and 1990, and 0 otherwise, to represent the impact of the 
privatisation reform. 
ERM: which is 1 for 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997, and 0 otherwise, to represent 
the stabilising effect the exchange rate mechanism had on Portuguese public finances in the 
period before qualifying for the Euro-zone. 
FC: which is 1 for 2009, and 0 otherwise, to represent the impact of the financial crises on the 
Portuguese economy. 
The dummy variables describe a change in the surplus-to-GDP ratio that is not due to changes 
in debt or automatic stabilisers/cyclical events. After the results of regression model I will 
estimate the baseline model, and show that the exclusion of the dummy variables destroys 
inference.  
The results from OLS estimation on regression model (63) are reported in Table 6: 
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Table 6: Regression results from the fiscal feedback rule.
a)
  
 Coefficient    S.E t-statistic P- value 
st-1 0.325777 0.09701 3.36 0.0025 
Constant -5.39933 0.8806 -6.13 0.0000 
bt 0.0713490 0.01529 4.67 0.0001 
xt 0.327161 0.09673 3.38 0.0024 
IMF2 2.99965 0.8765 3.42 0.0021 
ERM 2.14966 0.6311 3.41 0.0022 
FC -6.77366 0.9957 -6.80 0.0000 
OIL3 3.56696 0.7891 4.52 0.0001 
PRIV 2.25885 0.9810 2.30 0.0299 
1,13741         T = 34        R
2
=0,85    adj R
2
= 0,806             F[8,25]=18,17[0,000]** 
χ2norm[2] = 2,6449 [0,2665] 
Far(1-2)[2,23] = 2.9419 [0.0728] 
Farch(1)[1,32] = 0.16949 [0.6833] 
Fhet[11,22] = 1.0163 [0.4645] 
Fhetx[14,19] = 0.76057 [0.6954] 
 
a) 
 Estimation period is 1977-2011.  
The results from regression model 0 are promising. The misspecification tests are not 
significant, so the regression model fulfils the classical assumptions for the error-term, and 
the specification of the model is correct. This implies that the different variances are estimated 
correctly and test-statistics will be correct.  
The reported standard error of the model is 1,137. And the reported adjusted R
2
 is 0,806. This 
implies that 80,6% of the observed variation in surplus-to-GDP is explained by the model, 
adjusted for the degrees of freedom. The regression model overall is significant, with a 
reported F-value of 18,17, with a p-value at 0,000 it is possible to reject the null hypothesis at 
a 99% significance level.  
 
Figure 7: Observed surplus-to-GDP (broken line) versus the fitted values from the estimated 
regression model (solid line). 
ˆ
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Figure 7 shows how well the model fits the data, where s is the observed surplus, and fitted is 
the regression model. 
The estimated coefficients report the different explanatory variables’ contribution to variation 
in the surplus-to-GDP ratio at time t. The estimated coefficient for the lagged surplus-to-GDP 
value, st-1, has a reported coefficient value of 0,325 with a standard error of 0,097. The 
reported t-statistic is 3,36, and from the reported p-value of 0,0025 we can reject the null-
hypothesis that ρ=0 and conclude that st-1 is a significant explanatory variable when 
estimating st at a 95% level of significance. The economic implication of a positive 
coefficient for the lagged surplus-to-GDP variable is that running a surplus in the past period 
contributes to running a surplus in the present period. Increasing the surplus-to-GDP by one 
unit in the past period will increase surplus-to-GDP in present period with 0,325.  
The estimated coefficient for the constant term is according to its p-value statistically 
different from zero. The economic interpretation of this is a “non-zero” surplus that will cause 
trend growth in debt. (Afonso, et al., 2011). 
The reported estimated coefficient for the debt-to-GDP ratio is 0,071, with a standard error of 
0,015. The reported t-statistic is 4,67,  with a p-value of 0,0001 which we can reject the null 
hypothesis of θ=0 and conclude that debt-to-GDP significantly different from zero and 
explains variation in surplus-to-GDP. The economic implication of a positive response in 
surplus from an increase in debt is that fiscal policy is on a sustainable path, and tries to 
correct for an increase in debt. The null-hypothesis of passive fiscal policy, θ=1, is rejected at 
the 99% level with a t-test and the conclusion of active fiscal policy can be drawn. 
When there is a positive output gap, i.e. output above normal or potential, there is a positive 
response in surplus-to-GDP. A 1 unit increase in the output-gap make the surplus-to-GDP 
ratio increases 0,327, with a standard error of 0,096. The reported p-value confirms that the 
output-gap is a significant explanatory variable. The surplus-to-GDP ratio can be interpreted 
as “weakly pro-cyclical”. The cyclical elasticity of the budget in Portugal is about 0,46, and if 
the reported value is smaller than this coefficient, the budget is regarded as pro-cyclical, 
larger than 0,46 as “counter-cyclical” and not statistically different from 0,46 automatic 
stabilisers are let to work. A statistically insignificant coefficient implies a-cyclical fiscal 
policy. (Afonso, et al., 2011). Performing a hypothesis test, where the null-hypothesis is 
γ=0,46 and the alternative is γ<0,46, will not  lead to a rejection at the 95% level, but at the 
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90% level of significance. This implies that fiscal policy represented by the budget surplus-to-
GDP ratios is weakly pro-cyclical. 
The 2
nd
 IMF “cure” in 1983-84 had a positive contribution to the surplus-to-GDP ratio with 
an estimated coefficient of 2,999 and a standard error of 0,876. The reported p-value confirms 
that variable is significant and the null-hypothesis of β1=0 can be rejected.  
The exchange rate mechanism was in place from 1992 to 1997 and led to the qualification to 
join the Euro-zone. The estimated coefficient is 2,149 with a standard error of 0,631. The 
reported t-statistic, 3,41, with p-value  0,002 let ERM to be considered a significant variable. 
The ERM was a period of continuous devaluation and decreasing inflation, debt-to-GDP and 
surplus-to-GDP stabilisation in order to meet the Maastricht criteria. Portugal managed to 
meet the criteria as can be seen from the positive and significant coefficient for that period.  
The global financial crisis that hit Europe with full force in 2009 had a negative impact on the 
surplus-to-GDP ratio. The estimated coefficient for the financial crises, FC, is -6,773 with a 
reported standard error of 0,995. The reported p-value is 0,000 and the null-hypthesis is reject, 
and FC is statistically different from zero. Due to the rejection of the null-hypothesis at the 
95% significance level the financial crisis is considered significant explanatory variable. The 
high impact coefficient is due to the counter-cyclical discretionary measures that were 
conducted in order to minimise the impact from the global financial crisis. A more thorough 
description of the financial crisis’ impact on the Portuguese economy is provided in section 
2.4. 
The 3
rd
 oil shock has an estimated coefficient of 3,566 with a reported standard error of 0,789. 
The reported p-value makes it possible to conclude that the 3
rd
 oil shock has a coefficient that 
is statistically different from zero, and is significant as an explanatory variable at the 95% 
confidence level. When oil prices fell by 60 % in 1986 it was acknowledged as the 3
rd
 oil 
shock. Portugal is dependent on imported energy, and when most companies are state-owned 
this type of shock will have a positive impact on the surplus-to-GDP ratio because the 
production costs of enterprises will fall. For oil exporting countries, like the US, UK and 
Norway this was the start of a recession and mass unemployment.     
In 1989-90 Portugal reformed its constitution and one of the consequences was a wave of 
privatisation of enterprises. The revenue from these sales, and the fact that these enterprises 
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would no longer be listed in the public budget, contributed to an increased surplus-to-GDP 
ratio. This is illustrated by the positive estimated coefficient β5 at 2,258 with a reported 
standard error of 0,981. The reported p-value makes it possible to reject the null-hypothesis 
and conclude that the privatisation reform in 1989-90 had an impact on the surplus-to-GDP 
ratio. 
Recursive graphics is a way of illustrating the stability of the different estimated parameters 
(Hendry & Nielsen, 2007). Recursive graphics for the estimated coefficients in regression 
model (63) is illustrated in Figure 8. The fifteen first observations have been used for 
initialisation and the series reported here is from 1992 until 2011.  Panel a) shows the 
estimated coefficient for lagged surplus-to-GDP within a band of two standard errors (broken 
lines), and has been fairly stable, but with an increase in 2004. The intercept (panel b)) and 
the coefficient for debt (panel c)) are statistically significant for all the sample lengths covered 
by the table, and they both change in the mid-2000s. This suggests that the last few 
observations carry a lot of weight for separating the constant terms from the debt variable. 
Panel d) shows the estimated coefficient for the output gap, γ, which is reduced gradually, but 
which is still marginally significantly different from zero for the full sample, and with a 
sizeable point estimate of 0.3.  
 
Figure 8: Recursive graphics of the estimated coefficients. 
a) ˆ  
b) constant
 
c) ˆ  d) ˆ  
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I will also estimate the baseline regression model from Claeys (2008): 
(64) ttttt xbss   1 . 
The regression results from estimating (64) by OLS are reported in Table 7: 
Table 7: Regression results from baseline fiscal feedback rule
a) 
 Coefficient  S.E t-statistic P-value 
st-1 0.616214 0.1507 4.09 0.0003 
Constant -1.16846 1.413 -0.827 0.4149 
bt 0.0132449 0.02490 0.532 0.5987 
xt 0.0867007 0.1530 0.567 0.5752 
2,1661      T=34          R
2 
= 0,3611      adj R
2
= 0,297     F[3,30]=5,654 [0,003]** 
χ2norm[2] = 6.7120 [0.0349]* 
Far(1-2)[2,28] = 0.92859 [0.4069] 
Farch(1)[1,32] = 0.022605 [0.8814] 
Fhet[6,27] = 2.7086 [0.0344]* 
Fhetx[9,24] = 3.8032 [0.0042]** 
 
a) 
 Estimation period is 1977-2011.  
Regression model (64) explains 36,11% of the variation in surplus-to-GDP, and a reported 
standard error of the regression of 2,166. The joint null hypothesis of the F-test is rejected at 
both the 95 and 99% level of significance.  
The misspecification tests regarding normality and heteroskedasticity are significant at the 
99% level, and the reported test-statistics may therefore be biased. 
Overall, regression model 0 is superior to (64), which can be considered to have an omitted 
variable bias.  
 
Figure 9: Observed surplus-to-GDP (broken) versus the fitted values (solid) from the 
estimated baseline regression model. 
ˆ
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4.6 Testing for absence of cointegration 
On the basis of the unit-root tests for the annual dataset I chose the surplus-to-GDP ratio and 
the debt-to-GDP as non-stationary variables. So far I have assumed that including the dummy 
variables is OK due to the fact that none of the misspecification tests for regression model 0 
were significant. As already noted, non-stationary variables raise the issue of a spurious 
regression as well as its opposite, namely that the two variables are cointegrated. In order to 
confirm that the results I obtained from regression model 0 are correct, I will perform a 
cointegration test on the model.  
In order to test for cointegration in regression model (63) I formulate the model as an error-
correction model, henceforth ECM. 
(65) ttttt bszs   1 ,  
where tz is a vector of  stationary stochastic variables (the deterministic variables (dummies)  
have been omitted in order to simplify the notation.) I then add and subtract st-1: 
(66) ttttttt bsszss    111  
(67)   ttttt bszs   11  
(67) is the ECM form of regression model 0. After the reparametrisation the standard errors 
and misspecification tests remain the same (Hendry & Nielsen, 2007, p. 244).  
Under the null-hypothesis of no cointegration there is no error-correction in model (67), i.e. 
  01  . Under the alternative hypothesis of cointegration there is error-correction in the 
model, i.e.   01  . If the model has error-correction there exists a connection between 
surplus-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP, and the variables are cointegrated. 
The test-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no cointegration becomes:   
(68) 
 
 
95,6
09701,0
132577,0
1ˆ
1ˆ









se
c  
which is compared to (simulated) critical values from a “Dickey-Fuller type” distribution. The 
critical values of the ECM cointegration tests depend on the number of I(1) explanatory 
52 
 
variables that are included in level form in the ECM model. In my case there is only one I(1) 
explanatory variable and the number of observations here is 34. With reference to Mackinnon 
(1991, p. 275, table 1) the 5% critical DF value is   
(69) 94,2
34
36,8
34
738,2
8321,2
2)34,1,(




CDF . 
Since the test-statistic is below the critical value for the Dickey-Fuller distribution we can 
reject the null hypothesis of spurious regression and we conclude that the ECM regression 0 is 
balanced with cointegrated variables.  For the estimated regression model 0 this means that 
the reported results are correct. 
The economic implication of cointegration is that undiscounted public debt is finite in the 
long run, according to Claeys (2008, p. 13). 
This is only a formal result however, since the true critical values of the ECM cointegration 
test are known to depend not only on the number of included I(1) variables, but also on the 
included I(0) variables and the deterministic dummy variable for regime shifts. There is no 
readily available tabulation of the relevant “true” critical values for our case.  In order to take 
leverage due to the inclusion of the stationary output-gap variable, one possibility is to regard 
it, for the purpose of inference, as an I(1) variable.  Hence, we calculate the critical values for 
two non-stationary series, DF(C,2,34) , which becomes  
(70)   52,3
34
98,8
34
967,5
3377,3
234,2,




CDF . 
The issue of the dummy variables is different and what matters for unit-root inference is 
whether they accumulate to a trend under the null of no cointegration. If they do accumulate 
to a trend, their critical values are affected, but if they do not, they can be thought of as (zero) 
residuals and the only modification needed is to reduce the number of observations. In our 
case, the dummies are single instance zero-one variables so under the null of no cointegration 
there is virtually no trend. In sum therefore, a robust test of cointegration can be based on 
DF(C,2,29) where the number of observations are corrected for number of dummy variables. 
(71)   554,3
29
98,8
29
967,5
3377,3
229,2,




CDF .    
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Hendry and Nielsen (2007, p. 251) argue that the dummy variables may accumulate to a 
trend. If the dummy variables accumulate to a trend as argued by Hendry and Nielsen (2007, 
p. 251) the suggested approach is to subtract the dummy variable’s mean values. The result is 
that the dummies will be approximately constant, rather than trending.  
I formulate a regression model in order to counteract the cumulated trend in dummy variables: 
(72) 
   
     VIRPPRIVLIOOILCFFC
MREERMFMIIMFxbss tttt

 
543
211
33
22


,
 
where the upper bar represents mean. The results from regression model (72) are reported in 
Table 8. 
Table 8: Regression results from “de-meaned” regime dummy variablesa) 
 Coefficient  S.E t-value P-value 
st-1 0.325777 0.09701 3.36 0.0025 
Constant -5.01124 0.8686 -5.77 0.0000 
bt 0.0713490 0.01529 4.67 0.0001 
xt 0.327161 0.09673 3.38 0.0024 
IMF2-IMF2 2.99965 0.8765 3.42 0.0021 
ERM-ERM 2.14966 0.6311 3.41 0.0022 
FC-FC 3.56696 0.7891 4.52 0.0001 
OIL3-OIL3 2.25885 0.9810 2.30 0.0299 
PRIV-PRIV -6.77366 0.9957 -6.80 0.0000 
ˆ 1,3741        T=  34        R2 = 0,853     adj R2= 0,8062    F[8,25] = 18,17 [0,000]* 
χ2norm[2] = 2,6449 [0,2665] 
Far(1-2)[2,23] = 2.9419 [0.0728] 
Farch(1)[1,32] = 0.16949 [0.6833] 
Fhet[11,22] = 1.0163 [0.4645] 
Fhetx[14,19] = 0.76057 [0.6954] 
 
a) 
 Estimation period is 1977-2011.  
The only thing affected by this process is the constant term. This confirms that the most 
appropriate critical values are from the DF distribution with a constant.  
The conclusion is cointegration between debt-to-GDP and surplus-to-GDP, and the results 
derived in section 4.5 from regression model (63) are not spurious.  
The main findings from regression model (63) are evidence of a weakly pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy in the Portuguese economy and existence of a positive debt response in the surplus-to-
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GDP ratio. This is a small indicator of sustainable fiscal policy, i.e. that the surplus-to-GDP 
adjusts to the new debt level as in the theoretical model presented in section 3.2.1, and by 
Bohn (1998). 
Is fiscal policy in Portugal sustainable? The regime changes in Portugal represented by 
dummy variables are a reason for concern. Can Portugal manage on their own? Three of the 
four “positive” regime changes are due to exogenous events.  
IMF dictating monetary policy in 1983-1984 contributed to an increase in surplus-to-GDP. As 
explained in section 2.2 an “IMF-cure” consists of export stimulation through devaluation, 
lower wages, austerity, increased interest rates and stricter credit controls. 
During the exchange rate mechanism it was Portugal’s policies that made them qualify for the 
Euro-zone. From Figure 3and Figure 5 surplus-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP remained within the 
levels dictated by the Masstricht criteria until 2004, but after that they are far off. The 
experience with IMF and ERM shows that when the “stick-and-carrot” goes, or external 
oversight is relaxed, sound fiscal policy suffers.  
Portugal formally joined the EU during the 3rd oil shock, with the European Single Act also 
coming into place in 1986, and in 1987 the EU doubled their structural funds, which boosted 
the Portuguese economy further.  
The privatisation reform was Portuguese policy, but in light of fiscal sustainability it can be 
considered a “one-off-measure”. It generates revenue the year its enacted, but all future 
possible profit is forgone. 
Claeys (2008, p. 20) stress that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for debt is not that 
important. As long as the stabilising response comes about on average will it be a sufficient 
requirement for sustainability. The reported coefficient in the Portuguese fiscal data is close to 
zero, while still significantly different from zero. However, the response is less than 
proportional. In order to actually be able to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio significantly the 
response should be at least proportional (Favero & Monacelli, 2005). The motivation behind 
this is that in order to have a stable debt-to-GDP ratio, the surplus-to-GDP will have to 
increase more than debt-to-GDP. If the increase in debt is motivated by investments this will, 
hopefully, boost the economy and the surplus will increase due to automatic fiscal stabilisers 
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(reduced unemployment benefits, etc.). But, as seen in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), when 
debt-to-GDP reaches the 90% threshold, growth can be difficult to achieve.  
The required debt response can be illustrated by the debt-stabilising surplus requirement 
derived from the flow budget constraint (Claeys, 2008, pp. 14-15). 
(73) 
 
  ttt
t
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b 


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1
1
.  
In (73) rt is the interest rate on government debt, and gt is the growth rate of the economy 
(growth in GDP).st and bt are still surplus-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP respectively. Debt 
stabilising is equivalent to keeping bt=bt-1, and the required debt-stabilising surplus becomes 
(74) 1
1



 t
t
tt
t b
g
gr
s . 
The reported growth rate in GDP for the last for the quarter in 2011 is -1,32%. And the yield 
to maturity of a 10 year Portuguese government bond is 13,8% (ECB, 2012). Inserting the 
current values of the variables in (74) becomes 
(75) 5,168,107
)0132,0(1
)0132,0(138,0



ts  
Debt stabilisation requires a government surplus-to-GDP of 16,5%. So to be able to pay off 
debt Portugal needs to run a surplus larger than 16,5% of GDP.   
The calculations above illustrate a strict requirement for debt-stabilisation. A requirement for 
a 16,5% surplus-to-GDP ratio is harsh, especially considering that the debt response is only 
0,05, so the rest of the increase in surplus-to-GDP has to come from elsewhere.  
Portugal is now on a path with negative growth in output, and from the debt-stabilising 
surplus the requirement to overcome the debt trap is even larger.  
From the theoretical model in section 3.2.1, when the interest rate on debt exceeds the 
economic growth rate, it implies an unstable wealth-ratio and exploding debt levels. 
Explosive debt-to-GDP levels are consistent with Figure 3 from 2005 and onwards. 
56 
 
5 Conclusion 
In this thesis I have presented a theoretical background and framework to analyse fiscal policy 
sustainability. I have analysed fiscal policy in Portugal from 1977 until 2011 in light of their 
economic history.  
The results where promising in the sense that I still found a positive response in surplus-to-
GDP that Afonso, et al. (2011) also found in their article using data until 2007. I also found 
evidence of a weakly pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  
However, the response is far from proportional, and not consistent with passive fiscal policy. 
The requirement for debt-stabilisation that I found, a surplus-to-GDP of 16,5% is, without 
sounding unreasonable, impossible to achieve, at least when taking into account negative 
growth in GDP. 
 Interest rates have declined in 2012 due to Mario Draghi’s promises to “do whatever it takes 
to save the Euro-zone”. There still is a long way to go before the growth rate in GDP exceeds 
real interest rates, which is the theoretical approach to avoid exploding debt. Also, trying to 
stabilise debt at the current levels of interest and growth will require a level of austerity not 
consistent with economic growth.  
To conclude, Portugal is the “living evidence” of how debt levels explode when interest rates 
exceeds the growth rate of the economy. However, the positive response in fiscal policy to 
increasing debt levels may be evidence of effects from the last EDP, and hope that the 
positive effects on the economy will last even when the external oversight is gone.  
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